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I. Introduction
All legal systems are moulded by the particular context in which they operate. Non-state law is no different in this regard. The impact of historical, political, economic and cultural factors on the existence and operation of non-state law is well documented.
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When analysing non-state law, it is clear that it cannot be viewed in isolation from state law with which it coexists or from the broader context in which it operates. There is true particularly of religious and customary law which is the focus of the present enquiry.
The tendency to date has been to focus on the range of factors that exist within the state that can influence the evolution of these types of non-state law. This approach is unduly limiting, however, and needs to be expanded so as to include an explicitly international law dimension. prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 5 These examples reflect quite traditional views of gender relations and punishments for transgressing community mores but they do more than that. They also reflect more deep seated beliefs that are not entirely easy to reconcile with the fundamental principles of international human rights law. The emphasis in international human rights law on individual rights grounded in the inherent dignity and worth of every human being does not always sit well with the moral and philosophical underpinnings of religious law 6 or the communitarian focus of customary law. Taken in the round, these considerations may suggest an irreconcilable conflict between international human rights law and non-state law. While acknowledging the potential for considerable conflict between them, it would be overly simplistic to view the relationship in such one dimensional terms particularly when it seems to be based on perceptions of non-state law as a homogenous and static body of law 7 and international human rights law as a series of absolute and unyielding human rights norms.
Any fruitful enquiry into the impact of international human rights law on nonstate law must start by recognizing the dynamic nature of the latter 8 and the potential inherent in the former to accommodate national and regional variations without compromising its fundamental tenets. 9 While international human rights law can certainly . 6 See further, J J Shestack, 'The Jurisprudence of Human Rights' in T Meron, Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford University Press, 1984) . 7 In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that it is possible for different interpretations of non-state law to exist. See, eg, the discussion in A Scolnicov, 'Religious law, religious courts and human rights within Israeli constitutional structure ' (2006) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732, 733; Mashhour (n 2). 8 See also, in a similar vein, Calaguas (n 4) 534; Perry (n 4) [77] [78] [79] . 9 See also, Perry (n 4) 72- 73. act as a constraint on particular aspects of non-state law, it can also act as a catalyst for the more widespread use and evolution of non-state law. It is also important to acknowledge that it is not a one way relationship. Non-state law can inform the interpretation of international human rights law. In doing so, it can heighten the relevance of international human rights law to the everyday lives of a considerable proportion of the world's population and increase its efficacy on the ground. While this perception of the relationship between international and non-state law may seem overly optimistic, recent developments in international practice lend a certain credence to it.
This chapter tracks these developments and draws out their significance primarily for non-state law. It begins with a brief discussion of the concept of non-state law in order to establish some parameters to the present enquiry. It also maps out the role of the state in mediating the relationship between international and non-state law. required to undertake the necessary measures to render it compatible with its international obligations.
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The situation is more complex when non-state law operates in parallel to the state justice system without any form of official recognition. Take, for example, the situation where an individual submits voluntarily to the jurisdiction of a religious court even though the court does not comply with the international requirements of a fair trial and notwithstanding the existence of state courts that are fully rights compliant. If the court is simply operating de facto without any official recognition, the state cannot be held directly responsible for its conduct. This raises the question whether international law provides a somewhat perverse incentive to states to avoid engaging with non-state law.
This would lead to the curious result that international law could help to insulate nonstate law from state intervention notwithstanding the human rights harm that may be caused by non-state law. It is doubtful whether this is correct at least to the extent that it is asserted in unqualified terms. This is because international human rights law imposes obligations on the state not only to respect human rights but also to protect these rights against interferences by private individuals and organisations. 28 In the example given, it is possible that there may be a positive obligation on the state to protect the individual against any interference with her right to a fair trial by the religious court. The difficulty is that the extent of the state's positive obligations to protect human rights is far from clear. According to the international jurisprudence, the scope of these positive 27 rights on the basis that the individual could have avoided any negative impact on the exercise of her human rights but chose not to do so. For example, it may deny any interference with the right to a fair trial because the individual submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of a religious court even though she knew that the court did not comply with this right and notwithstanding the fact that she could have accessed state courts that were rights compliant. In the past, this line of argument has been successful but it is questionable whether it will continue to be. 31 Recent case law suggests that even though the individual could have acted to minimise any negative impact on the exercise of her rights there may still be an interference with her human rights for which the state will be answerable at the international level.
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Another strand to this argument is the claim that the individual has waived the exercise of her human rights by submitting to the jurisdiction of the religious court rather than to the state courts. According to the international jurisprudence, it is possible to waive the exercise of a human right but it is subject to several conditions. To the extent that the waiver is 'permissible' it 'must not run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner and requires minimum guarantees commensurate to the waiver's importance'. 33 This suggests several factors that must be taken into account when considering the validity and efficacy of a waiver. The waiver must (a) be permissible although there is little guidance in the jurisprudence on when a 31 See, eg, the review of the jurisprudence in Eweida and others v United Kingdom App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR, 15 January 2013) para 83. 32 Ibid, paras 83, 109. In assessing whether the interference is justified, the Court will take into account the individual's ability to circumvent the negative impact on the exercise of his rights. Nevertheless, the key point is that the state is held to account even in these circumstances. 33 
IV. The rights of indigenous peoples under international human rights law: A catalyst for the greater recognition and use of non-state law
Normative developments concerning the rights of indigenous peoples have the potential to exert considerable influence on the recognition and development of their customary laws and juridical systems. This is evident from the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 40 See, eg, P Alston, 'Beyond "them" and "us": Putting treaty body reform into perspective' in P Alston and J Crawford (eds), give due recognition to' customary law in adjudicating the rights of indigenous peoples relating to their lands, territories and resources. 44 In addition to this, any decision concerning the resolution of a dispute between an indigenous people and the state or other third party must give 'due consideration to the … rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned'. 45 In this respect, the Declaration should act as an important catalyst for the greater recognition and use of this form of customary law.
The precise implications of these provisions become more apparent from the drafting history of the Declaration. The drafting history shows that the provisions were not intended to create new legal systems. 46 Nor, it seems, were they intended to establish parallel legal systems or to allow indigenous peoples to opt out of the state system. 47 Admittedly, concerns were expressed about the creation of 'parallel and … compatibility was assured not only by virtue of the wording of the Declaration 54 but also by the 'dynamic' character of their customary law and the fact that they considered themselves bound by international human rights law. 55 Aside from this, the drafting history demonstrates how concern for human rights played such an important role in the drafting of the Declaration. There was a general consensus that existing formulations of human rights had proved inadequate in addressing the serious deprivations suffered by indigenous peoples who remain among the poorest and most marginalized in the world.
Against this backdrop, the provisions on indigenous peoples' law can be seen as a way of ensuring greater respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, most notably, their right to respect for their identity 56 and their right to self-determination. 57 It demonstrates a strong justificatory basis for these provisions, one that is firmly rooted in international human rights norms and linked very much to the specific characteristics of indigenous peoples.
When combined with the requirement that indigenous peoples' laws must be compatible with international human rights laws, it shows how non-state law has to potential to reinforce rather than weaken the global system for the protection of human rights.
Of course, it may be argued that as the Declaration is not legally binding, its significance is limited. This is questionable for several reasons. The Declaration is the product of over 20 years of negotiation and represents an important standard setting 169 of 1989, for example, requires states to have 'due regard' to customary law when applying national laws to indigenous and tribal peoples. 59 To the extent that they are compatible with human rights, indigenous and tribal peoples have the right to retain their own customs and institutions 60 and specifically to have their customs regarding penal matters respected and taken into consideration by state authorities when dealing with criminal cases. 61 Although the Convention has been ratified by a relatively small number of states, its influence has extended beyond these states and can be linked to developments at the regional and global levels. 62 It is possible to identify similar trends at the regional level, specifically, within the Inter-American human rights system. 63 In several landmark cases, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has held that the recognition of customary law in the demarcation and titling of ancestral land is legally required under the American Convention on Human Rights. 64 Admittedly, this may seem discriminatory as it seems to introduce different systems of regulation of land ownership depending on whether or not one is a member of an indigenous people. The better view is that this is an example of where differently situated people must be treated differently. 65 In addition to this, the adoption of a purely civil law concept of 'property' would operate to exclude a significant proportion of humanity from the protection of the right to respect for one's property and this, in itself, would be discriminatory. 66 It is also important to bear in mind that a failure to recognize customary law could undermine or even destroy the ability of indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional relationship with their ancestral lands. This, in turn, could have far reaching implications for their other human rights, notably, their right to life, to food, and to respect for their indigenous identity. 67 Recognizing customary law in these circumstances can be vital to maintaining the physical and cultural wellbeing of indigenous peoples that might not be achievable by other means. While this is a powerful argument for the recognition of the customary law of indigenous peoples, it is doubtful whether this argument can be deployed in support of the more widespread recognition of other forms of non-state law. It will be difficult to establish such a direct link between the failure to recognize non-state law and such grave human rights violations occurring outside an indigenous context. Furthermore, international practice to date reveals that current interpretations of the right to respect for identity and the right to freedom of religion do not compel the state to recognize other forms of customary or religious law. 68 
V. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A catalyst for the reform and evolution of non-state law
The negative impact of non-state law on the rights of women is well documented.
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Indeed, it often seems that the principle of gender equality is an insurmountable obstacle to any attempt to reconcile non-state law and international human rights law. This issue is explored in the present section with particular reference to developments relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. As there are currently 188 state parties to this Convention, 70 it is a useful global benchmark against which to assess the potential impact of international human rights law on nonstate law in the particular area of gender equality.
At the outset, it is important to note that a sizeable number of states have made reservations to the Convention based on religious or customary law. 71 For the most part, the reservations are based on religious law, especially Sharia law. 72 They stipulate either that the state is not bound by certain articles of the Convention or that it is bound only insofar as the Convention does not conflict with religious or customary law. They are a concrete illustration of how non-state law can be invoked to limit a state's international obligations. For this reason, these reservations may be seen to cast doubt on the ability of international human rights law to influence religious and customary law. This is doubtful for several reasons. Convention provisions that are subject to reservations on the basis that they may conflict with Sharia law tend to vary. 73 While some states enter a general reservation, others refer only to specific articles and, then, not always to the same ones. 74 At the very least, this suggests that there are different interpretations of Sharia law, some of which are more compatible than others with the requirements of the Convention. 75 The second is due to the international response to these reservations. A substantial number of states have entered formal objections to them. 76 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which monitors and promotes compliance with the Convention, has also objected to these reservations. 77 For the most part, these objections are based on the perception that the reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. 78 As such, they call into question the validity of the reservations and the viability of attempts to use non-state law to limit a state's international human rights obligations. This sustained pressure has led to the withdrawal of some of these reservations either in whole or in part. 79 The withdrawal of these reservations is significant as it suggests that religious and customary law is not set in stone but is capable of being interpreted in an evolving manner and in a way that is compatible with international human rights law.
Notwithstanding the existence of the reservations, the Committee reviews each state's compliance with all the provisions of the Convention and makes a number of concluding recommendations. Although these recommendations are not legally binding they provide an authoritative interpretation of the Convention and can influence state behaviour. Several trends emerge from these recommendations. The first is that there are some religious and customary laws that are deemed to be completely incompatible with the Convention. This is true, for example, of laws permitting polygamy and child marriages. In these instances, the state concerned is called upon to eliminate these laws. 80 Several states have already taken measures to do so. 81 It is just one example of how international human rights law can impact on non-state law. However, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture. There is no evidence to suggest that the Convention requires the wholesale abolition of religious or customary law. For the most part, attention is directed to rendering this law compatible with the Convention.
A second trend is that religious and customary law is regarded as having the capacity to evolve in line with international standards. 82 Attempts to portray religious or customary law as incapable of reform are consistently challenged and rejected by the Committee. 83 Instead, the Committee focuses on encouraging a more flexible interpretation of these laws and a sharing of best practice. For example, it has commented positively on one state's 'gradual, greater flexibility in the interpretation of Sharia' 84 and on another state 'leading the way' for other states with similar reservations to lift their reservations. 85 On a number of occasions, the Committee refers to the existence of a 'comparative jurisprudence seeking to interpret Islamic law in harmony with international human rights standards' 86 and frequently calls on states to 'study reforms in other countries with similar legal traditions with a view to reviewing and reforming personal laws' so that they conform to the Convention. 87 These recommendations highlight the Committee's firm belief in the capacity of non-state law to develop in line with international standards but they do more than that. They also demonstrate the potential normative significance of developments taking place at the national level. These developments merit further study given their potential to contribute to an international consensus on how best to develop religious and customary law in line with international human rights law.
A third trend is that states are required to harmonize statutory, religious and customary law with the Convention. 88 States have been called upon to raise awareness of the precedence of international human rights law over religious and customary laws that discriminate against women. 89 They have also been called upon to adopt awarenessraising measures to ensure that customary or religious courts are familiar with the concept of equality under the Convention and adopt decisions consistent with it. 90 On occasion, the Committee has called on the state to ensure that the procedure of customary courts is 'brought into line with statutory courts,' to ensure that individuals are aware that they can request the transfer of a case to a state court 91 or to introduce a choice of court where none exists. 92 All these recommendations, if implemented, could have significant implications not only on customary and religious law but on the non-state institutions that interpret and apply it.
More generally, the Committee has called on states to undertake a 'comprehensive review process' with a view to ensuring the removal of all discriminatory provisions against women 'within customary, religious and modern laws'. 93 98 The law reform process itself must be fully inclusive, 99 with the effective participation of traditional and religious leaders, civil society representatives and women's organisations. 100 Beyond this, the modalities are left to the state and communities concerned to develop religious and customary law in a manner that is consistent with the Convention. This is a pragmatic and conceptually coherent approach. It allows local variations to be factored into the process of reform without compromising the fundamental tenets of the Convention. 101 Further by co-opting traditional and religious leaders into this process, it can heighten the prospects for a greater understanding and more effective implementation of international human rights law on the ground.
VI. Conclusion
The starting point for this chapter was the recognition that non-state law is moulded by the specific context in which it operates. This is commonly recognized but what is not always recognized is that this context now has an international law dimension, specifically, one based on international human rights law. This oversight is understandable given the state-centred approach that still dominates international human rights law and the very nature of non-state law. Through the concept of state responsibility, however, there is a gateway for the emergence of a relationship between the two bodies of law. Admittedly, what we are witnessing are the very early stages in this relationship. Nevertheless, recent developments suggest that the level of engagement between the two is set to increase rather than diminish in the coming years and that international human rights law may exert a growing influence on non-state law.
This raises the question as to how to characterise the relationship between international human rights law and non-state law. It is all too easy to portray it as an inherently hostile one. Examples abound of particular forms of human rights harm caused by non-state law. They seem to offer little grounds for optimism for any constructive engagement between international human rights law and non-state law. This chapter calls into question such a one-dimensional view of this relationship. Certainly, there are aspects of non-state law that cannot be reconciled with international human rights law. To the extent that the state complies with its international obligations in good faith, it will mean that non-state law will come under considerable pressure to change these particular laws. At the same time, focussing exclusively on these particular aspects of non-state law ignores the potential for positive engagement with international human rights law and presents a somewhat distorted view of the relationship between them.
International human rights law can require the elimination of some non-state laws but it can also act as a catalyst for the recognition and evolution of other aspects of this body of law. As the case-study of indigenous peoples' rights demonstrates, it can lead to the greater recognition and use of their customary laws and juridical systems. In this way, international human rights law can contribute to the growth of the customary law of indigenous peoples. It is doubtful whether it will have a similar impact on other forms of non-state law. In the case of indigenous peoples, there is a strong justificatory basis for recognizing their customary laws and systems. It helps to ensure the more effective exercise of human rights by one of the most marginalized groups of peoples in the world.
In these circumstances, the rationale for the recognition of non-state law is one that is rooted firmly in the basic principles of international human rights law. When viewed in combination with the requirement to respect human rights, it demonstrates how non-state law has the potential to strengthen rather than undermine international human rights law.
While the case-study on indigenous peoples focussed on how international human rights law can act as a catalyst for the recognition of non-state law, the case-study on gender equality focussed on how it could lead to its reform. Even though international human rights law can act as the catalyst for reform, it does not attempt to micro-manage the process. Instead, it stipulates the need for a participatory and inclusive reform process and establishes the broad objectives to be achieved by this process. Beyond this, it is left to the relevant stakeholders at the national level to develop non-state law in a way that respects human rights. This enables the law to be developed in a way that is sensitive to local values while remaining consistent with international human rights standards. This demonstrates the potential normative significance of developments at the national level not only for the population concerned but for the international community as a whole. These developments at the national level can generate an international consensus on how religious and customary law should be interpreted so that it respects human rights. In doing so, they can also inform the interpretation of international human rights law. In this way, they can help international human rights law to move beyond debates about cultural relativism and towards more constructive discussions about how it should be interpreted and implemented.
Clearly, it would be misleading to portray the relationship between international human rights law and non-state law as an entirely harmonious one. There remains considerable scope for tension and conflict between the two. However, recent developments suggest that there is a coherent, conceptual framework for the emergence of a more constructive relationship between them. By harnessing the pull of non-state law and institutions, international human rights law can ensure its own, more widespread acceptance and effective implementation on the ground. By encouraging an inclusive and participatory process of developing religious and customary laws, international human rights law can help ensure that these laws retain their on going relevance and genuine support among all sections of the communities to which they apply. More fundamentally, these developments call into question common perceptions of the impact of international human rights law on non-state law. International human rights law will not lead inevitably to the wholesale decline or demise of non-state law. Instead, in many instances, it can act as a catalyst for the greater recognition of some types of non-state law and, more generally, for the evolution of non-state law in a manner that is sensitive to local traditions and values while remaining consistent with the fundamental tenets of international human rights law.
